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Abstract 
The EU has had a multi-faceted approach in addressing agricultural runoff, specifically when 
relating to the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. Here three EU policies and instruments—the 
Common Agricultural Policy (the ‘CAP’), the Water Framework Directive (the ‘WFD’) and 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (the ‘SBSR’)—are examined within the framework 
of the legal system of Finland with the aim to scrutinize the practical legal and normative 
ramifications of these governance tools. It is suggested that even when the SBSR has 
agricultural runoff as its ratio moderatio, its implications at the practical level are limited. 
The results of the CAP are more tangible in the practitioners’ lives but at the same time they 
are far from cost-effective. The ‘post-Weserian’ normativity of the WFD ought to result in 
legally binding water quality standards for individual undertakings but the procedural 
question lingers: as long as the agricultural emissions are not within the scope of any 
environmental permitting procedure, implementing the norm may require further 
modifications of the administrative procedures, at least in those Member States having 
agricultural water pollution as a significant environmental concern.
1 Introduction 
The EU has had a multi-faceted approach in addressing agricultural runoff, specifically when 
relating to the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea: the Common Agricultural Policy1 (‘CAP’), 
the oldest of the endeavours, was followed in 2000 by the Water Framework Directive2 
(‘WFD’) and its combined approach to pollution sources. Most recently the EU Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region3 (‘Strategy’, ‘SBSR’) was inaugurated as a representative of 
macroregional governance having agriculture as its ratio legis—or rather, when noting the 
limited legal stringency of the apparatus, ratio moderatio. In what follows, the policies and 
instruments are examined in the legal system of Finland – country that is one of the main 
culprits behind the poor condition of the sea—with an aim to scrutinize the practical legal and 
normative ramifications of these governance tools. How do their implementation restrict the 
individual practitioner’s right to exploit and cultivate his or her land? Does the latest 
amendment or transformation of EU water law—namely the so-called Weser ruling (CJEU 
C-461/13)4 the European Court of Justice (‘Court’, ‘CJEU’) gave in summer 2015—have an 
impact also on the WFD’s combined approach to water pollution and thus also the regulation 
of agricultural runoff? What are the practical effects of the financial or environmental 
protection instrument, the CAP, to the farmer—or to the water quality?  
Examination of these questions begins with taking a look at the Strategy and its 
consequences for practical agricultural undertakings. Second, the CAP is studied with an 
objective of finding out whether its reforms have ‘greened’ agricultural undertakings and, 
                                                        
1 The EU legislation on CAP has been issued in four regulations (colloquially referred to as pillars) on rural 
development, horizontal issues, direct payments, and market measures. See respectively Regulation (EU) 
No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 [2013] OJ L347/487; Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the 
common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 
2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) 485/2008 [2013] OJ L347/549; Regulation (EU) No 
1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct 
payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 [2013] OJ 
L347/608; and Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 
2013 establishing a common organization of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001, and (EC) No 1234/2007 [2013] OJ 
L347/671. 
2 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1 (hereafter WFD) 
3 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (29/30 October 2009), 15265/1/09 REV 1; 
Communication concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, COM(2009) 248 final 
(hereafter Strategy). 
4 Case C-461/13 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland eV v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2015] ECR 
I-433 (Weser -case). 
also, the efficacy of the instrument when compared to the monetary input. Third, the WFD is 
put in the limelight: its current tendencies towards legal normativity is explained and then 
evaluated whether this new normativity can be implemented to the diffuse pollution source 
called agricultural runoff. In the final section, the influences of the three governance 
instruments are summed up, especially from the viewpoint of the practitioner. The question 
raised is: which governance tools, if any, have an impact on farming practices or the farmers’ 
daily undertakings?  
2 The Strategy and Agriculture as Ratio Moderatio 
The Council approved a strategic road map, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, in 
2009, followed by the Commission’s communication on the matter.5 The EU developed the 
approach focusing on regions as an attempt to balance the enlargement and with external 
relations in mind.6 The Commission presented the Strategy in 2009 after a joint drafting 
process with the stakeholders and the Member States. Interestingly, the results of the 
collaborative process were virtually congruent, all participants favouring an integrated and 
multi-sectoral approach.7 What integration in this context refers to is a contested question but 
can be summarized as understanding that regional drivers of growth are distinct but 
interdependent.8  
The Baltic region was a natural choice for a territorial cohesion project: its nature as a 
geographical space between the international and national levels is so well established that 
analytical concepts such as ‘meso-’ or ‘macroregion’ or a definition of ‘peripheral subregion’ 
describe the region well. Macroregion, the most established of these concepts, refers to ‘a 
meso-level bringing together a group of units that are at the same time part of (or related to) a 
                                                        
5 Strategy (n 3). 
6 Kristine Kern, ‘Governance for Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region’ (2011) 42(1) Journal of 
Baltic Studies 21, 22. The history of cooperation in the region can be dated back to the era of the Hanseatic 
League, ibid., 29. 
7 The Strategy (n 3) 1, 4. Similar strategy processes are also ongoing in the Danube region, the Adriatic-Ionian 
region and the Alpine region, see respectively the Communication concerning the European Union Strategy for 
the Danube Region, 08.12.2010 - COM(2010) 715 final, the Communication concerning the European Union 
Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region - 17.06.2014 - COM(2014) 357 final, and the Communication 
concerning the European Union Strategy for the Alpine Region - 28.7.2015 - COM(2015) 366 final. There have 
been deliberations whether collaboration in e.g. the North Sea or Carpathian regions might evolve into formal 
macroregional strategies. The latest evaluations are, however, rather hesitant and careful. See DG Internal 
Policies Policy Department B, ‘New role of Macro-Regions in European Territorial Cooperation’, 
IP/B/REGI/FWC/2010_002/LOT02-C01/SC01 (2015), 73–4, and Annex, 100–101. 
8 For a summary of the questions which emerged, see Tamás Kaiser, ‘The added value of the integrated 
approach: the case of Hungary’ (Conference on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region: Challenges and 
Chances 2014–2020) (2015) 100, 102. 
more comprehensive political entity’.9 Irrespective of the used label, the Baltic Sea is 
undisputedly the most established area for co-operation in Europe and has the longest 
tradition in the field.10 That is not to say that the Baltic Sea region would be a homogenous 
area, rather the contrary: regarding socio-economic factors the region is a heterogeneous one. 
The key common feature is the highly polluted sea shared by the littoral states.11  
These features add to the Baltic Sea region’s suitability to a macroregional 
governance approach, macroregional governance being a step forward from territorial-based 
governance to functional governance. The functional aspect is present in the Strategy 
especially with regard to agricultural runoffs and the sea, and one of the justifications 
underpinning the Strategy is addressing the issue in an integrated manner throughout the 
whole region.12 Since macroregional governance must have at least one shared problem that 
justifies the governance apparatus, this key problem could be called ratio moderatio (ex 
analogia to ratio legis). That would make the state of the Baltic Sea the ratio moderatio of 
the Strategy.  
Irrespective of the disparities during the Strategy’s drafting process, the 
environmental aspects remained a key feature, establishing the first of four pillars in the 
Strategy. The Strategy is presented in four pillars for structural purposes only, their order or 
arrangement is not supposed to convey any independent meaning—on the contrary, the 
Commission encourages seeing the four pillars as entwined, as an integrated approach 
suggests.13 Within these environmental concerns, the question of nutrient runoffs was the 
first, others dealing with biodiversity protection, hazardous substances, clean shipping and 
climate change mitigation and adaption.14 The Strategy is accompanied by a list of priority 
areas. Out of a total of 17 groups two are on agriculture: the first on sustainable agriculture in 
                                                        
9  Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern, ‘Macro-region, ‘Macro-regionalization’ and Macro-regional Strategies in 
the European Union: Towards a New Form of European Governance?' in Stefan Gänzle and Kristine Kern (eds), 
A ‘macro-regional’ Europe in the Making: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2016) 3, 5.  
10 Stefan Gänzle, ‘Introduction: Transnational Governance and Policy-Making in the Baltic Sea Region’ (2011) 
42(1) Journal of Baltic Studies 1, 1, 4.  
11 Alexandre Dubois et al., EU macro-regions and macro-regional strategies – A scoping study (Nordregio 
2009) 43, 25-9,  <http://www.nordregio.se/Publications/Publications-2009/EU-macro-regions-and-macro-
regional-strategies/> accessed 5 December 2016. 
12  Gänzle and Kern (n 9) 3.  
13 The Strategy (n 3) 6. 
14 The other three being economic prosperity; accessibility and attractiveness; and safety and security, Jonathan 
Metzger and Peter Schmitt, ‘When Soft Spaces Harden: The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region’ (2012) 
44(2) Environment and Planning A 263, 272. 
general and the eleventh on nutrient runoffs to the sea.15 Even though the order of the pillars 
is not decisive in any regard and the priority list is flexible and reviewed on a regular basis, 
the structure supports the claims that the position of agri-environmental causes in the Strategy 
is strong.16 As planned, the priority list was updated in 2015. 
The relation between the Strategy and the work of HELCOM is of interest. The 
Helsinki Convention and HELCOM as its secretariat have aimed at improving the ecosystem 
of the Baltic Sea since the 1970s. It is an aptly named intergovernmental steering body when 
it comes to cooperation concerning environmental issues.17 HELCOM’s main objective is an 
environmental one: to protect, restore and enhance the marine ecosystem that is notoriously 
fragile and polluted.18 Even though the efficacy of its work has been discussed, its 
significance as a regional network has not.19 HELCOM represents intergovernmental 
tradition, partly due to its age—HELCOM was initiated during the strong East-West divide. 
Even though frames of mind change more slowly than societal systems emerge and collapse, 
transnational governance and collaborative actions were better equipped after the end of the 
East-West divide, especially so in the environmental and economic sectors. HELCOM’s 
leading role in intergovernmental activities has later been enhanced with other environmental 
initiatives which also wish to include private and non-governmental actors in the governance 
processes, a development which has earned the Baltic region the title of the laboratory for 
environmental governance.20  
The environmental collaboration appears in networks defined by the theme, resulting 
in overlapping participation—one organization can be and often is a member of multiple 
networks each having its own, distinct political influence. It is notable concerning the 
agricultural runoff problem that organizations aiming to tackle the dilemma do not form one 
single (regional or environmental) network but many. The aim of these organizations might 
be unanimous but the way in which they interact in the developments of normative or 
                                                        
15 The Strategy (n 3) 3, 6–7 and The SBSR priority areas, 1, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/cooperate/baltic/doc/priority_areas.pdf> accessed 5 December 
2016. 
16 Rikard Bengtsson, ‘An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Complex Challenges’ 
(2009) 9 European Policy Analysis 1, 3-4. 
17 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention); 
Gänzle (n 10) 2. Even though non-binding, recommendations are HELCOM’s main policy tool; Stacy D. 
VanDeveer, ‘Networked Baltic Environmental Cooperation’ 42(1) Journal of Baltic Studies 37, 40, also serves 
as a short summary of HELCOM, its working practice and place in the network of operators.  
18 Kern (n 6) 26-7.  
19 Gänzle (n 10) 4-5.  
20 Coalition Clean Baltic, Union of the Baltic Cities, and Baltic Sea Action Group being some of them,  Gänzle 
(n 10) 4-5; Kern (n 6) 23-4.  An extensive even though still partial list of environmental initiatives in the area is 
given in Table 1 of VanDeveer (n 17) 37. 
scientific data varies. This flux of influence and dense networks makes measuring their 
impact difficult: even if the development of a concrete matter occurs, pinpointing the 
development to the actions of a certain organization or network is nearly impossible. This 
challenge has not gone unnoticed and the role of implementation and efficacy has gained 
weight among the goals of the actors.21 This also applies to the improvements of 
environmental quality. 
However, the multitude of actors and initiatives coupled with the difficulty of 
establishing cause and effect patterns have prompted questions about the Strategy’s 
rationality, especially due to its emphasis on agri-environmentality.22 Being built on ‘three 
noes’ has raised questions whether the Strategy can bring any added value to the region—the 
‘three noes’ sum up the reality that the European Commission accepted no new institutions, 
legislation, or instruments while initiating or implementing the Strategy.23 From the Union’s 
perspective due to the ‘three noes’ all value from the strategies is added value, since no 
significant input is required. Regarding the relation between HELCOM and the Strategy, the 
Commission found that HELCOM has not been successful enough in finding support from all 
relevant sectors. This is due to HELCOM’s notoriously environmentalist approach, which has 
caused, for example, the agricultural sector to shy away from HELCOM’s work. In the 
Commission’s view the Strategy has succeeded better in this regard; the Strategy’s cross-
sectoral approach has proved worthwhile.24  
Even when the Strategy does not allow for new institutions or legislation, it 
nonetheless is a form of new governance, and as such questions of legitimacy are justified. 
Multi-level and multi-functional governance apparatuses are at risk of being vague or 
equivocal, a logical consequence of the fact that the results of the strategies are hard to 
evaluate. Accountability can be established as a ‘master value’ securing the legitimacy of the 
governance actions taken—in the case of the Strategy, it would be ruled as ineffectual 
without the accountability of those responsible for the agricultural runoffs.25 However, the 
macroregional sphere necessitates a redefinition of accountability from its legal counterpart: 
                                                        
21 VanDeveer (n 17) 38-9. 
22 Bengtsson (n 16) 6. 
23 Metzger and Schmitt (n 14) 272–3.  
24 Other strategic benefits were the ability to tackle issues shared in a certain region but not in the whole Union, 
Á Kelemen, ‘Assessing the added value of macro-regional strategies – Environment Discussion paper’, 46, in 
the Commission Staff Working Document - 27.6.2013 - COM(2013) 468 final—a stance directly quoted in 
European Commission 2013, 6. 
25  Rasmus Kløcker Larsen and Neil Powell, 'Making Sense of Accountability in Baltic Agro-Environmental 
Governance: The Case of Denmark's Green Growth Strategy' (2013) 33(2) Social and Environmental 
Accountability Journal, 71, 72, 75, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969160X.2012.743276> accessed 5 December 
2016. 
due to the large number of parties involved accountability is seen to be more of a ‘work-in-
progress’, a continuous process between different actors, existing in their discussions and 
exchanges and being also itself subject to constant change. This understanding of 
accountability is comprehended as the only sensible one when it comes to macroregional 
governance: since the terrain itself is flexible and in constant evolution, amendments to the 
understanding of accountability must also be made. That means that accountability is seen as 
a part of this unending process of various actors and acts, not as a dipstick used to evaluate 
the process.26  
The Strategy can be taken to represent an interactionist perspective by admitting that 
multiple interests are at stake in the agricultural runoffs issue, contradictory even to the extent 
of colliding, and that the Strategy is the balancing tool to settle the predicament. This 
description is deemed the most suitable since in the Strategy eutrophication is not a problem 
to be tackled but a dilemma that needs to be balanced. Also, other solutions taken into the 
Strategy enhance this interpretation: the Strategy is an operation between different actors and 
their viewpoints, not an endeavour to enhance scientific knowledge itself or justify decisions 
merely based on scientific information. 27  
The different analyses and viewpoints examined above share an understanding of the 
Strategy: in all its flexibility predicting its efficacy is if not directly impossible, at least a 
challenge, but even so the Strategy seems to deserve its place in the laboratory of governance 
that is the Baltic Sea region. However, due to the ‘three noes’ approach it can hardly have an 
influence in the practitioner’s daily life, if participating as a stakeholder is not included. Time 
will tell how the Strategy influenced the Baltic Sea’s environmental status—now such 
evaluations would be premature given the slow cycles of environmental and socio-political 
change. 
3 ‘Greening the CAP’ or Blue-Greening the Sea? 
The Common Agricultural Policy has been EU’s prime policy field for over half a century, 
also and especially budget-wise—over the years the CAP has been eating up as much as 70 
per cent of the community budget.28 During its lengthy history in EU policy-making the CAP 
                                                        
26 The authors readily admit that the promulgated understanding of accountability is not in congruence with 
normative responsibility or the strictly legal understanding of the concept, ibid., 75–6.  
27 Ibid., 77–9. 
28 The title of the chapter refers to the newest CAP reform, known as ‘Greening the CAP’ and concurrently also 
to the result of agricultural runoffs, eutrophication and blue-green algae, one of its outcomes. For an excellent 
historical and overall review of the CAP, see David Harvey, ‘What does the history of the Common Agricultural 
has undergone a number of repairs: in order to contextualize the newest reform and the 
aspirations attached to it a short examination of these repairs follows.  
Remodelling done in the late 1980s is known as the MacSharry reform; later ones are 
the Agenda 2000 and Fischler reforms. Methodologically speaking, analysing the three has 
proved to be a challenge when one standard tool for policy research, discourse analysis, has 
not been considered adequate: during the earlier years, policy makers were not expected to 
justify their actions to the same extent than is the case later in history.29 Most explanatory 
force has been found by combining multi-level, multi-functional and multi-lateral approaches 
in order to grasp an overall picture of the policy change.30 However, already turning to multi-
functional analysis construes a shift in the agricultural regulation research, since its aim is to 
incorporate agriculture as a field of industry into environmental law. The general objective of 
the approach is to regulate the environmental impacts of agriculture as with the point-source 
polluters.31 However, in the absence of more suitable solutions, in what follows multi-
functional analysis is also considered to be an agreeable one.  
In the MacSharry reform the agri-environmental issue was an unconventional 
approach—all but market imbalance or price support factors were conventional.32 Perhaps 
due to these broadened horizons the MacSharry reform has been described as ‘the most 
important CAP reform until that time’.33 The international trade negotiations of the era, viz. 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT, strongly influenced the reform: it has been suggested that 
the MacSharry reform accommodated the negotiation’s twists and turns.34 Thus, in terms of 
multi-lateral analysis, the GATT negotiations not only affected matters at their own level but 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Policy tell us?’ in Joseph A. McMahon and Michael N. Cardwell (eds), Research Handbook on EU Agricultural 
Law (Edward Elgar 2015). 
29  Isabelle Garzon, Reforming the Common Agricultural Policy: History of a Paradigm Change (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2006) 7.  
30 Ibid., 8–9. The multi-level players inf the field range from the Member States via EU organizations to the 
international level; multi-functional alludes to the various issues at stake; and the multi-lateral aspect deals with 
the bargaining involved. 
31 Massimo Monteduro, ‘Environmental Law and Agroecology: Transdisciplinary Approach to Public 
Ecosystem Services as a New Challenge for Environmental Legal Doctrine’ (2013) 22(1) European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review 2, 5. Naturally, multi-functional analysis also has other objectives, the aims of the 
analysis being multiple, but the diversity does not account for the underpinning methodological issue. 
Monteduro defines the aim of incorporation to be at least thirty years old. 
32 Garzon (n 29) 51. Finding environmental causes as a novelty in the 1990s might be slightly surprising, since 
environmental concerns had been in the public knowledge for already a good 20 years. The explanation goes 
that environmentality influenced the Union agriculture policy before the MacSharry reform but was only 
incorporated into the CAP then. Garzon (n 29) 53–4. 
33 Arlindo Cunha and Alan Swinbank, An Inside View of the CAP Reform Process: Explaining the MacSherry, 
Agenda 2000 and Fischler Reforms (OUP 2011) 68. 
34 Ibid., 72, 100. 
also as a horizontally-connected issue to the reform.35 Interestingly, the producers’ interest 
groups were the only part of civil society coercing the discussions.36 It must not hence come 
as a surprise that in the MacSharry reform agri-environmentality was not a decisive matter 
but a novelty.  
The weight of civil society augmented in and during the negotiations of the next 
reform, known as Agenda 2000.37 Not only did the producers’ organizations diversify but 
environmental groups also mobilized themselves, partly due to the new practice according to 
which environmental concerns were to be assimilated into all Union policies.38 Budgetary 
stringency was rudimentary as were considerations on cohesion, that is to say issues emerged 
along with the prospective enlargement of the Union.39 In this round, rural development was 
taken into the CAP by incorporating the agri-environmental measures into the second pillar 
of the CAP.40 In general, Agenda 2000 has been recalled either as a disappointment or as a 
reform of modest outcome. Regarding agri-environmentality, there might be more to the 
story than mere dissatisfaction: Agenda 2000 enlarged the space of the environmental NGO’s 
in the negotiation process and as such filled its niche in the sequel of reforms.  
The negotiations for the third of the previous reforms, the Fischler reform, 
commenced shortly after Agenda 2000 was compiled.41 Some hitherto elementary issues, 
such as budgetary rigour, were not advanced in the Fischler round whereas others, such as 
agri-environmentality, continued to improve their position. The latter was due to the 
increased significance of civil society after severe food crises and, also, an acknowledgement 
of the impact Union agriculture had on developing countries—as if the Union food policy 
started to develop a conscience.42 In spite of that, the diversification of the value base in the 
CAP negotiations was concretized in the Fischler reform: in this round not only food security 
but also environmental security were fully considered in the process. However, the broad 
choice of implementation options given to the Member States might have diluted the 
                                                        
35 Garzon (n 29) 74. 
36 Garzon (n 29) 75. 
37 Agenda 2000 was seen as a package of measures preparing the Union for enlargement and other novelties the 
new century might bring, Cunha and Swinbank (n 33) 115. 
38 Garzon (n 29) 88-90. 
39 Garzon (n 29) 93, 95. 
40 Harvey (n 29) 19, Garzon (n 29) 54.   
41 Berlin European Council 24–25 March 1999 Presidency Conclusions, paras 19 and 20. 
42 E.g. ethical issues started to have a say, Cunha and Swinbank (n 33) 126,  Garzon (n 29) 99-100. The 
international dimension paid a significant role in this reform: the Doha Agreement in 2001 caused external 
pressures, and this time the future prospects of agreements in agricultural policies between e.g. the US and the 
EU were at stake, ibid. Garzon 100-101. 
results—the Fischler reform has been nicknamed the cafeteria CAP43—but at least there was 
something to be diluted! 
Studies of the CAP over the past 20 years have noted that the earlier reforms consist 
of three different discourses: productivist, neo-liberal and multi-functional.44 Shortly put, the 
first-mentioned emphasizes the food security and farm income function of agriculture, the 
second is willing to admit more diverse functions of the industry, and the last focuses on the 
internal and external pressures this highly capitalized field faces, rising retrospectively from 
the Union budget negotiations and international trade negotiations.45 The three discourses 
promptly represent the ‘holy trinity’ of the CAP. Interestingly, the environmental causes are 
deemed to be a diversificator of (the allegedly) previously stable and (apparently also) 
unbiased situation, posing as a telltale sign of the assumptions where the funding of food 
production can be detached from the environment in which the food is produced. 
The Commission started the negotiations for the most recent reform with a document 
entitled ‘Greening the CAP’.46 Even though this reform known by the name of Commissioner 
Cialoş is rather fresh and crisp, it has already been examined whether it was worth its 
nickname by studying whether and how the discourses used were transformed into policy 
processes and instruments.47 It was found that the new direct payment scheme was justified 
using multi-functional discourse in which the environmental aspects were highlighted. The 
same combination of discourses was also present in the later negotiations on the CAP reform. 
Discourses on the basic payment scheme were apparently ‘blank’, including mainly 
bureaucratic formulations or numbers. Nevertheless, the researchers were able track down 
traces of productivist discourse—an interpretation seconded by commentators who found the 
main purpose of the reform was a justification of the excessive spending on agriculture.48 
                                                        
43 Alan Greer, Agricultural Policy in Europe (Manchester University Press 2005) 208, Cunha and Swinbank (n 
33) 133. 
44 Even though discourse analysis of the earliest negotiations has been challenging to undertake, credible results 
have been sourced from other reforms, see text at (n 29). 
45 Karmen Erjavec and Emil Erjavec, ‘‘Greening the CAP’ – Just a fashionable justification? A discourse 
analysis of the 2014–2020 CAP reform documents’ (2015) 51 Food Policy, 53, 55. 
46 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, 
natural resources and territorial challenges of the future (COM 2010 672 final); Cordula Rutz, Janet Dwyer and 
Jörg Schramek. ‘More New Wine in the Same Old Bottles? The Evolving Nature of the CAP Reform Debate in 
Europe, and Prospects for the Future’ (2014) 54(3) Sociologia Ruralis 266. 
47 Harvey (n 29) 24; Erjavec and Erjavec (n 45) 54, 56. On the procedural side, enhanced monitoring and 
evaluation have been found to be needed in the ‘greening’ process, see David Baldock, ‘Twisted together: 
European agriculture, environment and the Common Agricultural Policy’ in Joseph A. McMahon and Michael 
N. Cardwell (eds), Research Handbook on EU Agricultural Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 130; simultaneously, 
however, increasing the costs in the form of compliance checks, Harvey (n 29) 36. 
48 Erjavec and Erjavec (n 45) 57, Harvey (n 29) 24. 
Thus the ‘greening’ seems to come into question only after the basic level of production and 
income are secured: significant amounts of productivist discourse was utilized to justify 
support measures for young farmers, coupled payments and flexibility options for direct 
payment systems.49 
It might, however, be unwise to hasten to a conclusion that the greening of the CAP 
can be equated with white – or green – washing it. It took as late as the 1990s for 
environmental concerns to be a novelty, a new aspect starting to make its way into the 
decision-making process of the financial distribution tool. The CAP consists of trade, food 
supply and security, and environmental causes, all of which have their own objectives in the 
decision-making process. In retrospect, the progress and position of environmental concerns 
is evident. The same conclusion is reached when the distribution of funds was taken into 
account in the policy analysis. After assigning measures into certain discourses and 
comparing their share of the total CAP budget it was found that productivist discourse 
accounted for 60 per cent of it. Multi-functional discourses earned 30 per cent of the total, 
while neo-liberalist discourses were almost non-existent. While the ‘greening’ of CAP was 
the key element in multi-functional discourse, one might not exaggerate when saying that its 
share in the end result is greater than in the earlier versions of the CAP. A danger of 
oversimplification lingers, though: earlier CAP reform coupled ‘greening’ elements with 
payments, and, also in the latest reform, greening is arbitrary.50 Also, when it comes to the 
CAP reform(s), the language in the policy documents does not necessarily condense into 
equivalent measures and budget distributions.51 
It is thus relatively safe to declare that over the course of the decades the CAP has 
showed signs of greening: ecological considerations have emerged from the borders and 
arrived at the centre of policy-making. Another question is whether the money is effectively 
spent at the Member State level whilst implementing the CAP. The efficacy of the spending 
in relation to the environmental quality of the Baltic Sea can be examined using economic 
tools and such studies were also conducted in Finland before the newest reform. In 
counterfactual analysis, the focal point is the link between the money spent on agri-
environmental programmes and the environmental benefits gained with the funded measures. 
The results of the ‘social cost-benefit analysis’ were rather discouraging: the environmental 
                                                        
49 Erjavec and Erjavec (n 45) 58-9. The outcome has also been explained by the order of events: after securing 
the budget and Pillar I, support for the environmental issues in Pillar II underwent a long haul, Baldock (n 47) 
148. 
50 In the reform of 2003, cross compliance rules were introduced to direct payments, and were an element of 
‘greening’. 
51 Erjavec and Erjavec (n 45) 61. 
gains of reduced nutrient runoffs were considerably less than the money spent.52 The result is 
less surprising when one notes that over the years that Finland has had its agri-environmental 
programme the amounts of nitrate runoffs have increased, not decreased, contradicting the 
programme’s aims.53 Even when there might be justified reasons to oppose cost-benefit 
analyses in policy research, for analysing benefit distribution a cost-benefit analysis 
nonetheless suits well.54  
The complexity of the CAP makes clear answers concerning its effectiveness 
difficult. Ecological realities steer the evaluator in the same direction: since nutrients in water 
ecosystems compound, eutrophication is caused not only by current or recent emissions but 
also by emissions from previous years, even decades back that have become sedimented in 
the seabed. The complexity of the issue is thus multifaceted and makes evaluating the 
efficacy of the current—or earlier—measures, in economic analysis or otherwise, especially 
troublesome. The CAP, however, strongly influences the farming practices in the Member 
States, Finland included, by also being the main source of administrative work for the 
practitioners. Even when the results of the CAP or the efficacy of it might be controversial, 
its impact on the practitioners’ lives and practices is robust: part of the compensation from 
their work comes in the form of financial subsidies distributed within the CAP regime. Thus, 
the claim that CAP, unlike the previously studied Strategy, has had a tangible influence on 
the practitioner’s life. 
4 Combining the WFD’s Newly-found Normativity with Its Combined 
Approach 
The examination moves now from financial tools and governance mechanisms towards the 
realms of ‘the legal’: the WFD in its contemporary mien. Could the WFD cover the needs for 
normativity in the field, could—or should—its newly-found normativity have an impact on 
the individual farmer’s undertakings? After all, WFD Article 10 requires employment of a 
                                                        
52 Jussi Lankoski and Markku Ollikainen, ‘Counterfactual approach for assessing agri-environmental policy: 
Theory with an application to Finnish water protection policy’ (56) 2011 University of Helsinki, Department of 
Economics and Management Discussion Papers. The latest Union-level implementation report suggests 
improvement, even though uncertain ones, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against 
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53 The amounts of soil phosphorus have increased in some parts of the country, also proving the inefficacy of the 
programme, Lankoski and Ollikainen (n 52) 5. 
54  S. A. Shapiro and C. H. Schroeder, ‘Beyond cost-benefit analysis: A pragmatic reorientation’ (2008) 32(2) 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 433.  
combined approach to all pollution sources, diffuse and point-source alike, and in 
Article 10(2)(c) mentions the best environmental practices as one mechanism in which the 
approach should be instigated.55 How binding are these articles, legally speaking? 
Land-based water pollution from agriculture is a prime example of the ecosystems’ 
holistic reality, namely the fertilizers used in cultivation run off to the nearby waters and 
eventually to the sea. From the 1970s on these holistic ecosystems have been researched and 
managed using an adaptive management paradigm, a nowadays dominant nature resources 
management theory which also underpins the WFD.56 Adaptive management systems are 
complex and resilient and as such they have proved to be a trial for regulators—lawyers have 
recoiled from adaptive management as it fundamentally contradicts predictability and 
certainty.57 Regulating adaptive management is a challenge, especially in civil law systems 
that orbit rules—at most discussing their interpretation or characteristics, but never 
relinquishing their elementary position in the system. Much-debated principle or rule 
distinctions or dialogue over flexible norms might have enlivened the discourse, but one 
thing stays adamant: predictability is part of the law’s epistemology.58  
The incomparability of adaptive management and the normative is obvious when it 
comes to the regulation of large-scale adaptive water management, well illustrated by the 
Water Framework Directive, which has received much criticism from scientists, managers, 
and legal scholars, including claims that the WFD does not make the best use of ecological 
knowledge. In the WFD the ecological status of a water body is defined with biological 
‘quality elements’, classified by scientists in the Member States and unified at the EU level. 
However, when gauging the ‘good ecological status’ of waters, these elements are actually 
secondary features—quality is more about structures and processes of aquatic ecosystems 
                                                        
55 WFD Article 10(3) reaffirms that the WFD does not allow for any deterioration from the previous water 
quality requirements or emission controls set out in earlier EU legislation. It is also noted at the political level 
that lack of compatibility between the WFD and the CAP may explain the poor achievement of the former’s 
objectives. European Commission A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources Brussels, 14.11.2012 
COM(2012) 673 final, 4 and William Howarth, ‘Integrated water resources management and the European 
Union’s Common Agricultural Policy’ in Joseph A. McMahon and Michael N. Cardwell (eds), Research 
Handbook on EU Agricultural Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 246–7, 250, who couples the failure to the fact that 
the WFD as a whole regulates water quality rather that quantity, ibid. Howarth 260. 
56 The oft-cited C.S. Holling and others have been credited for initiating the paradigm shift from previous 
natural resources management, which in its practicality was less attached to the complexity of ecosystems, C. S. 
Holling (ed), Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (Wiley-Interscience, 1978) 377.  
57 For an excellent analysis of the law’s relation to adaptive management, see e.g. Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
‘Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism’ (2002) 87 
Minnesota Law Review 943; Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism’ (2002) 21 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189.  
58 This fact is shared by both common and civil law systems. What differ are their mechanisms for balancing 
predictability and flexibility and the struggles involved in the task.  
rather than the presence or absence of single elements.59 In the WFD the aim is that the 
quality of all water bodies should not deteriorate and that they should attain a good ecological 
status, objectives which are meticulously defined in the directive (Art. 4(1) and Annex V). 
Law scholarshave expressed interest in this ‘good status’ objective, deliberating over its 
normative impetus.60 The so-called ‘non-deterioration’ principle has shied away from the 
limelight: it has been commonly understood to refer to the quality of EU waters at the time 
the Directive was issued.61  
4.1 The WFD in the Court’s Reading 
In 2015, in the Weser ruling by the European Court of Justice, this interpretation of the ‘non-
deterioration’ principle was shown to be mistaken. The nature of adaptive management did 
not hinder the European Court of Justice from turning to legal formalism in its assessment of 
the Directive. In the Weser case the Court had its chance to have a say on the normativity of 
the established management system. Concurrently, the Court resolved the most suitable mode 
of regulation for adaptive water management, as far as its scope of review and limits of 
discretion allowed.62 But as always with EU law, enforcement lies in the hands of the 
Member States, which are thereby also responsible for enforcing the legal state the Weser 
ruling established.  
Regarding the Directive, the original enforcement was variegated: the Member States 
opted for a variety of implementation strategies. The Member States’ understanding of the 
normativity of the ‘good status’ objective might have been either the objective of best effort 
or the objective of result, or an amalgamation of both.63 Implementation of the WFD in 
Finland is an invigorating example of these variations: in Finland, what is taken into a river 
basin management plan (‘the RBMP’) ‘shall be taken into account’ in legal and 
administrative procedures relating to environmental matters.64 Due to the country’s 
                                                        
59 A thorough analysis of these questions is provided by Henrik Josefsson and Lasse Baaner’s, ‘The Water 
Framework Directive—A Directive for the Twenty-First Century?’ (2011) 23(3) Journal of Environmental Law 
463.  
60 Andrea M. Keessen et al., ‘European River Basin Districts: Are They Swimming in the Same Implementation 
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61 William Howarth, ‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: Proceduralisation, 
Participation and Practicalities’ (2009) 21 JEL 391, 411.  
62 The Weser -case (n 4). 
63 Keessen et al. (n 60), 206. 
64 Finnish Environmental Protection Act (n:o 527/2014) 51 § and Finnish Water Act (587/2011) Chapter 3, 6 §, 
both sections part of the regulation on the permit consideration. The Environmental Protection Act still lacks its 
geographical realities as a ‘land of a thousand lakes’, the demands of the EU water law are 
found to be especially pressing, tentatively also explaining the original reluctance to give 
normative clout to the WFD. 
The preliminary reference that prompted the Weser ruling was skilfully established 
that the questions set would focus solely on the normativity of individual undertakings. The 
preliminary reference gave the Court latitude at deliberating how the ‘good status’ objective 
and the non-deterioration principle ought to be interpreted and how they relate to individual 
undertakings and their authorization.65 The referring court insisted especially on the meaning 
and significance of the status classifications: the referring court wished to know which aspect 
of this process was decisive when defining the acquisition of the ‘good status’ objective.66 
Unlike the preceeding scholarly literature, the Court did not employ a distinction between the 
objectives of best effort and the objectives of result in its reasoning, but referred to two 
distinct but intrinsically linked obligations taken into the Directive: the obligation to prevent 
deterioration and the obligation to enhance.67 The Court continued with the understanding 
that the obligations came into being because of deliberate choices of the Union legislator, and 
hence protecting their normativity best served the legislator’s intention. Thus the Member 
States must refuse authorizing projects that might undermine the attainment of the said 
objectives, providing no exemption is granted according to the Article 4(7).68 
The second aspect in which the Court parted from the scholar’s ponderings was its 
focus on the non-deterioration principle.69 It established the principle as an independent key 
objective of the Directive. To achieve such an interpretation the Court dismissed the popular 
‘status class’ theory as one with merely instrumental value and opted for the ‘status quo’ 
version instead.70 Here the Court differentiated from the previous comprehension for the third 
time: instead of understanding the ‘status quo’ as one that prevailed at the time the Directive 
was issued, the Court understood ‘status quo’ to refer to the highest water quality achieved at 
                                                                                                                                                                            
formal English translation, but the unofficial English version of the Water Act is available online: 
<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110587.pdf> accessed 5 December 2016. 
65 The request for a preliminary ruling, The Weser -case (n 4). 
66 WFD, Annex V, ss 1.3. and 1.4.1. Much of the criticism the Directive has gained is rooted in aspects of this 
mechanism, see e.g. Baaner and Josefsson (n 59). 
67 The Weser -case (n 4) para 39. 
68 The Weser -case (n 4) paras 22, 50–51. The obligation prevails irrespective of the Member State’s possible 
negligence in compiling the programmes of measures, which include the definitions of ‘good status’ objectives, 
i.e. data according to which the deterioration is assessed. 
69 The non-deterioration principle has been noted but often not further elaborated since it has usually been 
interpreted as applying only between statuses or to the most severe cases, such as agricultural runoffs. See, for 
example, van Kempen (n 60) 527–28; Keessen and others (n 60) 210–12. 
70 The Weser -case (n 4) para 52 and, in more detail, Case C-461/13 Bund v Germany [2015] ECR I-433, 
Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 90.  
any point of time.71 Hence the quality of a waterbody does not meet the desired objective 
whenever deterioration occurs and, consequently, deterioration of the waterbody becomes 
accessible only when derogation is granted. 
When giving full normative clout to the environmental objectives and the non-
deterioration principle the Court in other words imposed traditional, formalistic legal logic on 
the adaptive water management regime: in the Court’s reading the environmental objectives 
are legal norms in the strictest sense and should be interpreted as such.72 The EU water 
quality law now includes clear rules and as with any rule, there is also the possibility of 
exemptions. Due to the WFD’s integrated and holistic approach as well as its desire for a 
combined approach, agricultural runoffs are equally part of the newly-established demands of 
increasingly stringent water quality demands. In particular, the new normativity of the non-
deterioration principle may be a challenge to implement, and not only regarding agricultural 
runoffs. The reasons behind the Court’s stance related to the long traditions and established 
notions of water law. As AG Jääskinen stated, ‘the concept of deterioration is a well-
established concept of water law, having a general, rather than technical or detailed scope’. In 
other words, the Court attempted to distance itself from the much-criticized technicalities in 
the WFD and examine the issue from a broader perspective.  
4.2 Individual Agricultural Undertakings, the Scope of Derogation and Environmental 
Permitting 
As always, when legal formalism is in question, alongside of clear rules comes the question 
of exceptions. The conditions on which derogation can be granted are listed in the WFD 
Article 4(7).73 It is noteworthy that the exception clause only applies to new endeavours 
causing a decline in water quality. Thus, if an existing activity is replaced with a new one and 
the detrimental effects remain equal or diminish, no exemption is needed.74 This rudimentary 
aspect of the derogation regime sets the stage for a mechanism that could be called 
‘replacement measures’. These are the measures applied when a novel undertaking in a 
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moderated waterbodies can be understood as one mechanism for ensuring the environmental quality objectives. 
Also Articles 4(4)–(5), which regulate the extensions granted for deadlines and the possibility of altering the 
environmental objectives, can be understood as leeway mechanisms. 
74 Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), Guidance Document 
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certain river basin district buys out existing establishments with detrimental effect, in order to 
ascertain that the water quality either improves or remains in status quo. Another variation is 
that the project that causes detrimental effect is coupled with activities that improve the water 
quality in the said river basin district, causing the overall level of the assessed quality 
elements not to deteriorate.  
Both these possibilities predict an interesting future for the agricultural industry. As a 
field of industry it is often among the biggest pollutants but in terms of individual farms it is 
a small player. Moreover, the rudimentary issue of agricultural runoffs not falling under the 
scope of any environmental permit again becomes relevant: the pollution from agricultural 
activities is not evaluated in environmental permits.75 Since the river basin management plans 
include all activities impacting the waters, agriculture is however included in the assessments 
and the fulfilment of the environmental objectives. Coupling this reality with the WFD’s 
normativity, and especially its derogation regime, becomes increasingly important now when 
the total pollution load has become ever more important. In a standard situation when 
deciding upon derogations the non-deterioration principle and the good status objective are 
treated differently: a derogation can be granted if the proposed undertaking causes 
detrimental effects due to ‘new modifications to the physical characteristics of a surface 
water body’ or when the status of a surface water body is estimated to deteriorate from ‘high’ 
to ‘good’ by an endeavour that is deemed sustainable.76  
Thus a novel undertaking may be granted an exemption to cause effects resulting in 
the plunge from ‘good status’ only if the deterioration is not caused by emission but by direct 
physical alterations of the water body. Detrimental effects caused by the emission-pollution 
mechanism can be exempted only when statuses above ‘good’ are in question, providing that 
the undertaking is pronounced sustainable.77 This reality might cause increasing tensions in 
the watershed between different actors, all of whom cause water pollution and only some fall 
into the scope of environmental permits.  
Could agriculture as a field of industry be eligible for exemption? Apart from the two 
general notions mentioned above, there are four more qualifications to be fulfilled if 
derogation is desired. Exemption from the rules is to be treated as a last resort, the reasoning 
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76 The WFD Art 4(7). 
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behind the planned modifications must be detailed in the RBMP’s, and conditions such as 
technical feasibility or disproportionate cost must not allow for a significantly better 
environmental option.78 The fourth condition is the most complex one. According to Article 
4(7)(c), reasons such as human health, safety or sustainable development might outweigh the 
attainment of the non-deterioration principle or the good status objective: the Article 
establishes a weighing and balancing mechanism to the exception regime. It is worth noting 
that weighing and balancing here is not a general ‘pro and con’ adjudication with no strings 
attached but a considerably more restricted activity between the attainment of the set 
objectives in Art. 4(1) and benefits for human health, safety, or sustainable development. 
Only ‘an overriding public interest’ makes this weighing and balancing unnecessary. That 
being the case, the condition of Art. 4(7)(c) concerns to the public interest only and all other 
requirements can be omitted. 
Article 4(7) employs broad concepts, all familiar elsewhere in environmental law: 
health and safety, public interest, and sustainability, but the article offers no further advice on 
interpretation. Since the case law on the WFD is yet to develop its own guidelines, some 
analogical aid can be sought from the case law of nature directives, especially the Habitats 
Directive79, a pivotal piece of EU nature conservation legislation utilizing similar concepts in 
its endeavour. The Habitats Directive established a Union-wide network of Natura 2000 
areas, aiming to safeguard ecosystems from endangering developments.80 Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive regulates the exemptions from the protection, allowing administrative 
permissions to undertakings with ‘imperative reasons of overriding public interest’—social 
and economic ones included—when alterative solutions are not available. The derogation 
regime in the Habitats Directive thus loosely resembles the one created in the WFD. The 
significance of the planned project to economic development and employment has been taken 
into account in a harbour case in Hamburg, Germany81; also elsewhere the severe 
employment situation and harsh economic conditions have been decisive when ruling in 
favour of an undertaking.82 In Rotterdam, the Netherlands, a major port was again granted an 
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79 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora [1992] OJ L206/7. 
80 Ibid. Article 6(3). 
81 Commission Opinion of 6.12.2011 delivered upon request of Germany pursuant to Art. 6(4) sub par. 2 of 
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82 Opinion of the Commission of 24/04/2003 Delivered upon request of Germany according to Art. 6 (4) Sub 
Par. 2 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of the natural habitats as well as the 
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artificial lake development in notoriously dry southern Europe, securing a water supply for 
local and regional water consumption, agriculture and industry have been determining 
factors, providing again that other feasible solutions have been absent.84 Thus the planned 
projects must have significant benefits before derogation could be granted—and only a 
notion this general can be condensed on the scope of derogation at the EU level.  
The agricultural industry’s standing in the ‘post-Weserian’ EU water law thus seems 
to be rather multifaceted. To begin with, the environmental objectives of the WFD are made 
legally binding in individual undertakings—but agricultural water pollution lacks the 
administrative-legal procedure in which this norm could be imposed upon it. The strict legal 
norms now in the WFD come with exceptions for significant undertakings in which dire 
public interest is involved. Domestic food production might be effortlessly counted as one 
significant undertaking in many Member States but, unfortunately only as a field of industry, 
not if individual farms are evaluated separately. Had the Member States permission granting 
systems for land-based pollution the farms would be evaluated individually, and none of 
them would fall under the scope of derogation according to the WFD Article 4(7). As a 
result, the regulation of agricultural runoffs might be against the newly-established norm of 
non-deterioration but mechanisms to enforce the norm are absent. 
 
5 Agricultural Water Pollution in the Triangle of Influence, Finances, and 
Normativity 
From the agricultural practitioner’s point of view the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
has proven to be relevant mainly as a channel for stakeholder participation, and has no 
tangible influence on the daily life of a practitioner. Its role as a balancing act, however, is 
significant, giving a voice to previously silenced stakeholder groups and bringing a new, 
presumably more impartial terrain for discourses about the development of the region. The 
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importance of these features should not be dismissed. The CAP, then again, is as practical in 
its aims as possible: more or less the whole of a farmer’s income consists of the financial aid 
distributed according to its varied schemes, no matter to what extent the aims of the 
programme would acknowledge something else or how much this reality is called 
‘unequivocally both de facto and de jure misguided’.85 However, the efficacy of the CAP has 
been criticized, its proved results in enhancing environmental quality being somewhat 
narrow. The criticism must nonetheless be read with a full understanding of the ecological 
underpinnings, namely the reality of nutrients becoming concentrated in the seabed. 
Then again the WFD especially in its ‘post-Weserian’ form might serve the needs of 
efficacy and bring results for anyone desiring that water quality be enhanced and polluters be 
held accountable. However, the diffuse nature of pollution would seem to escape the above-
described new normativity of the environmental quality objectives: as long as agricultural 
runoffs do not fall under the scope of any administrative procedure aiming to control 
environmental pollution, the farming practices and their consequences circumvent the 
normativity of EU water quality regulation. Since agricultural runoffs and other diffuse 
pollution sources are often the most significant reasons behind the failure to attain the desired 
environmental quality the ‘post-Weserian’ EU water law leaves agricultural pollution in a 
tight spot: it de facto acts as a hindrance or even obstacle for permitting other undertakings, 
resulting in a lack of mechanisms to counteract the situation. Given that the norm the Court 
established in the Weser ruling is rigorously implemented in the Member States, those 
struggling with the agricultural runoffs issue are likely to come up with some 
counterbalancing mechanisms in order to enable a variety of societal undertakings with water 
impacts.  
                                                        
85 Harvey (n 29) 34, who fiercely proscribes that the CAP would, could, or should be supporting farm incomes. 
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the programme allow for that interpretation. However, in actual reality the subsidies granted in the CAP 
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